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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

BRYAN W. CANNON and
DANA R. CANNON,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Plaintiffs & Appellants,
vs.
COMMONWEALTH WESTERN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, now known as
COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Case No. 870493-CA
Category 14b

Defendant & Respondent.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is from the summary judgment entered July
20, 1987 adjudging that appellants' compl aint for damages
arising from respondent's alleged refusal po make a 30-year
loan was barred by ' the Statute of Frauds], Utah Code Ann,
§ 25-5-4(1) (1984).

The Utah Supreme Coilrt had appellate

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant tq> Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(i)

(1987);

this

Court

has

jurisdiction

to

adjudicate the appeal pursuant to Utah Cdde Ann. §§ 78-22(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did

the

District

Court

err

in

ruling

that

an

alleged oral agreement to loan money for 30 years is subject
to

the

Statute

of

Frauds

and

that

the

possibility

of

respondent's performance within a year did not take that
alleged agreement from the Statute of Frauds?
2.

Did the District Court err in rejecting appellants1

untimely and inadequate attempted invocation of Rule 56(f) ,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, especially when there were no
disputed issues of material fact?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
This appeal involves the interpretation and application
of the following:
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1984):
Certain agreements void unless written and
subscribed.
In the following cases, every
agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereofr is in
writing subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof. . . .
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
defense required.
Supporting and opposing
affidavits
shall
be
made
on
personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
-2-

attached thereto or served ther 0with.
The
court may permit affidavits to be upplemented
or
opposed
by
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, or further affidclvits. When
a motion for summary judgment : s made and
supported as provided in this rule an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleadings, but h .s response,
by affidavits or as otherwise prov .ded in this
rule, must set forth specific f ac ts showing
that there is a genuine issue fori trial. If
he does not so respond, summary udgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered agai hst him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should
it appear from the affidavits lof a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a
continuance
to permit
affidavi ts to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by appellants on May 15,
1987, to recover damages and punitive damages they allegedly
incurred by reason of respondent's alleged! refusal to make
appellants a thirty-year loan.

R.2-7.

respondent

R.11-12,

moved

to

dismiss,

On June 4, 1987,
asserting

that

appellants' alleged oral contract was void under the Statute
of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1).

R|(.13-20

On June

24, 1987, appellants amended their Complaint, at 11 4, to
aver that the alleged oral contract to loan money for 30
years was evidenced by memoranda and documents executed by
respondent.

R.2-3, 25-26.
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Appellants

also

submitted

an Affidavit

of Bryan w.

Cannon, R.32-40, wherein Bryan W. Cannon stated, at II 10:
"Affiant

believes

that

additional

written

documents

evidencing the application for approval of, and a loan to be
made by Commonwealth to Affiant and spouse exist in nine
percent

(9%) one

Defendant."

(1)

[sic] in the file and

records of

R.34.

Respondent then filed an opposing Affidavit of Robert
Bradley Meadows, R.44-46, wherein affiant stated, at K 7:
"Contrary to Bryan Cannon's belief expressed in 1[ 10 of his
Affidavit, no documents authored or subscribed by defendant,
its agents or employees exist, or have ever existed, in the
files and records of defendant referring or relating in any
way

to

defendant's

alleged

offer

to

loan

money

to

plaintiffs; this is so because defendant never approved a
loan to plaintiffs and never authorized or approved a loan
commitment to plaintiffs,"
simultaneously

with

R.45.

respondent's

This affidavit was filed
Memorandum

in

reply

to

plaintiffs' Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss*

R.48-58.

(A copy of respondent's Memorandum is

included as Exhibit "A" to the Addendum, and is incorporated
herein by such reference.)

On appeal, appellants do not

raise any of the issues addressed in Exhibit "A"; instead,
they raise on appeal two arguments they presented at the
hearing on respondent's motion.

-.4-

The

hearing

on

respondent's

Motion

to

Dismiss

was

R.21.

At

properly and timely noticed for July 10, 11987.
that

hearing, appellants

argued

that

(1| the Statute of

Frauds did not apply to this action because! the alleged oral
contract to make a thirty-year loan to appellants could be
performed fully by respondent within one year; and (2) the
district

court

existence
agreement

of

should
writing

a

decision' concerning

sufficient

to

t^ke

the

the

alleged

out of the Statute of Frauds [until appellants

conducted discovery.
The

defer

district

R.73-74.
court

granted

respond ent's

Motion

to

Dismiss at that hearing, R.61; on July 20, 1987, Judge Bryan
signed a summary judgment dismissing appellants' claim on
the merits.

R.59-60.

On August 3, 1987, respondent served

its Notice of Entry of Judgment on appellants' counsel,
R.62-63; appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on August
18, 1987. R.66.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellants

applied

for

a

loan [from respondent*

R.2, 25.
2.

The loan alleged by appellants vjzas to be repaid

over 30 years.
3.

Had

R.4, 27.

appellants

made

loan

applications

to other

lenders in Salt Lake County, Utah, they could have "locked

-5-

in"

terms

respondent.
4.

comparable

to

those

requested

from

R.3, 26.

Appellant Bryan W. Cannon is an attorney practicing

law in Salt Lake City, Utah.
5.

they

R.6-7, 30-31.

Respondent declined to loan appellants money.

R.4,

27, 45.
6.

Respondent

never

committed

to

make

a

loan

to

appellants on the terms set forth in their complaint, or on
any other terms. R.45.
7.

No documents authored or subscribed by respondent,

its agents or employees, exist, or have ever existed, in the
files and records of respondent referring or relating in any
way

to

respondent's

appellants.

alleged

offer

to

loan

money

to

R.45.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The possibilities

completely

performed

its

(1) that respondent could have
alleged

obligations

within

one

year, or (2) that appellants conceivably might have repaid a
30-year loan within one year, are insufficient to take this
case out of the Statute of Frauds.

Bilateral contracts

performable by one party, but not by the other, within one
year are void under the one-year provision of the Statute of
Frauds.

For purposes of

the one-year

provision

of

the

Statute of Frauds, the parties' intention concerning the
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time

for

repayment, not

the

speculative

possibility

of

repayment within one year, controls.
2.

Because (1) it is undisputed there dre no writings

sufficient to take the alleged oral agreement out of the
Statute

of

discovery

Frauds;

whatsoever

(2) appellants
despite

(3) appellants failed

ample

never

attempted

time t \D do

any

so; and

to file an affidavit demonstrating

they were unjustifiably prevented from conducting necessary
discovery, the District Court properly rejected appellants'
untimely invocation of Rule 56(f).

ARGUMENT
I.
THE ORAL AGREEMENT ALLEGED BY APPELLANTS
IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
At pages 10-13 of their brief, appellants make two
related,

but

different, arguments

why

the

alleged

contract is not within the Statute of Frauds

oral

First, they

argue that even if performance "is highly improbable or not
expected

by the parties'1 within a year, the Statute of

Frauds is inapplicable if performance is nevertheless even
remotely possible.

Second, appellants argu^ that because

respondent could have disbursed funds within one year, the
Statute

of

Frauds

is similarly

inapplicab]J e.

below, neither contention has merit.
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As

shown

A.

The remote possibility of repayment within one year
of an alleged oral agreement intended by the
parties to extend over thirty years does not take
the alleged agreement out of the Statute of Frauds,
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) reads:
Certain agreements void unless written and
subscribed.
In the following casesf every
agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof. . . .
With

respect

to

their

first

argument,

appellants

apparently argue that since it is remotely possible they
could have repaid the alleged thirty-year loan within one
year, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable.

This doctrine

has no application to this case.
In Ellis v. Royster, (Tenn. Ct. App. April 12, 1984) (a
copy of the Royster opinion is included as Exhibit

,f M

B

to

the Addendum), the plaintiffs allegedly loaned defendant and
his wife money with repayment to occur over 48 months.

The

trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant on
the grounds that the Tennessee Statute of Frauds provision
functionally identical to Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) barred
the action.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the Statute of
Frauds was inapplicable because the defendant

could have

paid the debt in full at any time after making the debt;

-8-

specifically

that defendants

obligation

could have been

performed within one year after the date of the loan.

In

affirming the trial court, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
held:
The applicable rule is the statute is limited
to contracts which by a fair and reasonable
interpretation of the terms used by the
parties, and in view of all the circumstances,
does not admit of its performance according to
its language and contention within a year from
the time of its making . . . The test is not,
as the plaintiffs argue, that the debt could
have been paid in full in one year but rather
what the understanding of the parties was/
The understanding under plaintiffs theory and
the documents in evidence establish that
payments in satisfaction of the alleged loan
would extend repayments beyond a period of one
year.

~~

•

Roysterf Slip Opinion, Addendum Exhibit

'
ff f

B j, at 2nd printed

LEXIS page (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In other

words, in an alleged contract to loan money| the test is not
whether or not the loan might have possibly been paid within
a year; rather, the critical inquiry is the alleged period
over which repayment was expected by the parties to be made,
in this case, 30 years.
Similarly, in Sophie v. Ford, 230 A.DJ 568, 245 N.Y.S.
470 (App. Div. 1930), plaintiff sued defendant on an alleged
oral promise to pay a third party $200.00 levery four weeks
for two years.

Defendant performed for one year and then

stopped making payments, and plaintiff sued to recover the
remaining installments.

The trial court rjuled the alleged

-9-

oral agreement was enforceable, but the appellate division
of the New York Supreme Court reversed:
It is manifest that the bargain between the
parties must be construed as one to pay [the
third party] for the two succeeding years the
salary which he might have been receiving as
financial secretary of the Rochester Council
of the Knights of Columbus, the same to be
paid at the rate of $200 every four weeks.
Neither plaintiff, nor [the third person], for
whose benefit the contract was made, could
have compelled the payment of any installment
before the day it became due. Only one-half
of the installments fell due within the year
following the making of the contract.
The
agreement was clearly executory.
It is
evident, therefore, that it was not to be
performed within a year from the making
thereof . . . is void, and cannot be enforced.
Id. at 472.

Once again, then, the court ruled that an

agreement to pay money for a period extending beyond one
year is barred by the one-year provision of the Statute of

In Gibbons v. Stillwell, 149 Ill.App.3d 411, 500 N.E.2d
965 (1986), plaintiffs sued their attorneys for malpractice
arising from legal advice the attorneys gave plaintiffs in
connection with a bank's alleged breach of an oral agreement
to loan plaintiff $275,000 at a rate of interest of 12-3/4%
for a term of 20 years.

After the bank refused to lend

money on those terms, but offered to loan money at a higher
rate

of

interest

to

vary

with

the

bank's

prime

rate,

plaintiff requested his attorneys to advise him regarding
his rights against the bank.

Id^ at 967.

-10-

Citing the Illinois equivalent of Utah Code Ann. § 255-4(1), the trial court granted defendants summary judgment
on the grounds

that the alleged

agreement

could

not be

performed within one year, id. at 968, a|nd the appellate
court affirmed:

"Since the alleged oral agreement would

have been within

the Statute of Frauds, the defendants'

advice that it was unenforceable was, as the trial court
found,

proper

pleaded."

legal

advice

Id. at 970.

under

the

pircumstances

as

Once again, then,I an agreement to

make a loan to be repaid over' a period loinger than a year
was held void under the one-year provision pf the Statute of
Frauds.
Neither case cited by appellants at bage 11 of their
brief is to the contrary.
Utah.2d 102, 339 P.2d

In Christensen y. Christensen, 9

101 (1959), there | was no explicit

agreement regarding the time within which performance was to
occur; the Utah Supreme Court merely notep that because no
such time was agreed upon, it was easily possible for the
parties

to have performed

within a yearl

Id. at 103.

Similarly, in Hageman & Pond, Inc. v. Cla|rk, 69 Wyo. 154,
238 P.2d 919 (1951), there was no explicit|agreement by the
parties that performance would extend beyjond one year, as
there allegedly was in this case.
No reported Utah appellate decision explicitly holds
that an oral agreement to loan money for longer than one

-11-

year is void under the provisions of Utah Code Ann* § 25-54(1),

but

several

cases

indicate

in

dicta

that

such

agreements cannot be proven and are void.
The

first

such case is Commercial

Security Bank v.

Hodson, 15 Utah.2d 388, 393 P.2d 482 (1964).

In Hodson, the

bank sued to collect a promissory note, and the defendants
counterclaimed for the bank's alleged breach of an agreement
to loan them money.

The trial court directed a verdict in

favor of the bank on its claim, awarded the defendants only
one dollar as nominal damages on their counterclaim, and the
defendants appealed.
In reversing the trial court's award of only nominal
damages

to

defendants

Supreme Court noted:

on

their

counterclaim,

the

Utah

"The exact length of time that this

loan should last is not specified, but there is nothing in
the

evidence

terminate
added).

in

which
less

indicates
than

that

a year.11

the

loan

Id. at

should

not

48 5 (emphasis

Although § 25-5-4(1) was not specifically addressed

in Hodson, the above

language strongly

implies that the

Statute of Frauds would have barred proof of the purported
agreement had the loan been intended to extend beyond one
year.

In

the

present

appeal,

of

course, appellants1

performance would not terminate for 30 years.
I n M & S Constr. & Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank,
19 Utah.2d 36, 426 P.2d

227 (1967), the jury found that

-12-

defendant bank had orally agreed to loan plaintiff money "as
and when required" by plaintiff.

Id. at 228.

The trial

court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
grounds that the alleged agreement was void under § 25-54(1).

On plaintiff's appeal, the bank argued that the loan

was not to be repaid within one year because of language
contained in a separate contract.
court,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

In reversing the trial
held

that

the

separate

contract was legally irrelevant to the alleged agreement to
loan money:
You look at the terms of the contract claimed
to be vulnerable to the statute.
In this
casef it was the loan agreement/ — not a
separate contract of the borrower with someone
else, the terms of which latter might be fixed
as requiring performance two or ten years
beyond the year period.
Id. (emphasis added).

Once again, then, the Utah Supreme

Court has implied that proof of an alleged contract to loan
money

for

explicitly

longer
made

than

part

of

one

year,

if

the alleged

such

period

were

contract, would

be

barred by § 25-5-4(1).
Finally, in Taylor v. Turner, 27 UtaA. 2d 39, 492 P.2d
1343

(1972), plaintiffs

defendant.

sued

to recover money loaned to

The trial court awarded plaintiffs judgment, and

the defendant appealed, relying, in part, on § 25-5-4(1).
In affirming the trial court, the Utah Supr erne Court wrote:
Defendant contends that if there were an oral
agreement to loan money, such an agreement is
-13-

barred by the
4(1} , OcC.A
its terms is
year from the

Statute of Frauds, Section 25-51953, as an agreement which by
not to be performed within one
making thereof. . . .

[Plaintiff] testified that defendant requested
a loan for a period of six months to one
year. An oral promise to pay within a year is
valid and not within the Statute of Frauds,
Id. at 1345 (emphasis added).
language can be read:

There is only one way this

When a promise to pay extends beyond

one year, proof of the alleged agreement is barred by the
provisions of § 25-5-4(1).
In

summary,

there

is

no

support

for

appellants1

apparent contention that the bar of § 25-5-4(1) is somehow
removed by the mere speculative possibility of repayment
within one year of a loan intended by the parties to be
repaid over 30 years.
B.

The Statute of Frauds applies to bilaterial
agreements performable within one year by one party
but not by the other.
Appellants contend, at pages 11-12 of their brief, that

"in order for a bilateral contract to be subject to the oneyear provision of the statute of frauds, performance by both
parties

must

performance

by

extend
one

beyond
party.11

one
In

year,

and

fact, the

not

merely

rule

is the

opposite:
A bilateral contract is one that includes
promises
by both parties and
therefore
requires a performance in the future by each
of them. If either of these performances is
one that cannot be completed within one year,
-14-

the whole contract is within t)ie one year
clause of the statute as long as the contract
remains bilateral —
that is, as long as
neither party has fully performed his part.
The fact that the performance promised by the
other party is one that can be completed
within one year does not take the case out of
the one-year clause; and the contract is
unenforceable by either party unless he has a
sufficient memorandum signed by the other.
A. Corbin, 2 Corbin on Contracts § 456 aq page 572 (1950)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

This statement of the

law is consistent with the plain language of § 25-5-4(1),
which renders void
not

to

be

thereof."

ff

[e]very agreement that by its terms is

performed

within

Appellants

one

request

year

from

this Court

the

making

to engraft the

words "unless one party seeking to enforce the contract has
completed

performance

statute.

This

invitation.

within

Court

Section

every "agreement".

should,

that

per iod"

howeverl

onto

decline

the
that

25-5-4(1), by its terms, refers to
An agreement is an entire thing, not

divisible, and where that agreement cannot be completely
executed, on both sides, until more than a yeear has elapsed,
the case falls within the express words of § 25-5-4(1).
The

alleged

agreement

in

this

casee

is

bilateral

inasmuch as neither party has fully perfojrmed thereunder.
Utah

law

performance

is
by

clear,
one

of

moreover,
the

that

parties

even
to

actual

full

an alleged

oral

agreement intended by the parties to extendi beyond one year

will not entitle a party to recover upon the alleged oral
agreement.
In Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 125 P.
860

(1912), plaintiff

sued defendant on an alleged oral

agreement providing that if plaintiff would visit specified
eastern

cities

introducing

for

the

defendant's

purpose
products

of
into

advertising
those

and

markets,

defendant would give plaintiff (1) the exclusive right for
three

years

to

sell

defendant's

products

in

Utah

and

southern Idaho, and (2) a 2\% commission on all sales of
defendant's products made by anyone in Utah and southern
Idaho

during

that

three-year

period.

Plaintiff

fully

performed his obligations under the oral agreement within 35
days after its making, but defendant repudiated the oral
agreement.

Plaintiff

sued

on

the

agreement,

and

the

district court found it void under the one-year provision of
the Statute of Frauds.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

affirmed that the oral agreement was unenforceable.

Id. at

861.
The Utah Supreme Court has also specifically held more
recently that the provisions of § 25-5-4(1) are not avoided
by the full performance by one of the parties to an oral
agreement
performance.

requiring

more

than

one

year

for

its

In Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah.2d

72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963), plaintiff leasing company sued to
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enforce an oral 24-month lease of an autbmobile.

It is

undisputed

fully

that

plaintiff

leasing

company

had

performed by providing an automobile for defendant's use:
the

defendant

months.

had

in

fact

Id, at 247.

used

the aultomobile

for

22

Despite the plainti ff's actual full

performance within one year, the trial court ruled as a
matter of law that plaintiff's action on the alleged twoyear oral lease was barred by § 25-5-4(1).
notwithstanding

that

plaintiff

had

fully

Id.

On appeal,

performed

the

alleged oral agreement within one year, the) majority opinion
of the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling
that

the alleged

4(1).

oral

agreement

was

void

under

§ 25-5-

Id. at 248. Although two justices dissented from the

opinion's specific holding, each of them sbecifically noted
that

the alleged

4(1).

oral

agreement

was

void

under

§ 25-5-

Id. at 248 (Henriod, J., dissenting); id. at 250

(Callisterf J., dissenting).
The

law makes

performance

within

clear, then, that
one

year

by

one

eyen actual, full
pa rty

to

an

oral

agreement void under the one-year provision of the Statute
of

Frauds

does

enforceable.

not

make

the

otherwise

void

agreement

Accordingly, the fact that respondent might

have, or could have, loaned appellants mondy within one year
does

nothing

to

take

the alleged

prohibition of § 25-5-4(1).

— 1 ~7_

agreement

out of

the

II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENTERED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; RULE 56(f) DOES NOT HELP
APPELLANTS BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO
INVOKE ITS PROVISIONS TIMELY OR PROPERLY.
A.

There are no disputed issues of material fact.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly

supported, an adverse party may

not

rest upon

the mere

allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided for, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.

Brigham Truck and Implement Co. v. Fridal, 71 Utah

Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (1987) (citing, Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock
Transfer Co. , 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984)).

Appellants have

failed to identify any disputed issue of material fact.
At page

9 of

their

Brief, appellants

identify

the

single allegedly disputed issue of material fact germane to
this

appeal:

Plaintiffs'

"Particular

defense

to

documents

Defendant's

were

Motion

essential
based

to

on

the

statute of frauds where the existence of sufficient writings
to

satisfy

the

statute

Cannon's Affidavit.

was

alleged

(R.32-40).

opportunity, however,

by

Plaintiff

Bryan

Plaintiffs had not had an

to obtain

copies of

the documents

Plaintiffs believe exist in Defendant's files." Appellants1
Brief at p. 9.
The

Affidavit

Appellants'

Brief

of
(the

Bryan

W.

"Cannon
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Cannon

referred

Affidavit")

is

to

the

in

only

document
Motion

appellants
for

Summary

filed

in

opposition

Judgment.

(A

to
of

copy

respondent's
the

Cannon

Affidavit is contained at R.32-40, is included as Exhibit
"C" to the Addendum, and is incorporated herein by such
reference.)

An examination

of Exhibit "j(C,f discloses it

contains only one assertion pertaining to [the sole alleged
disputed

issue

existence

or

of

material

non-existence

fact
of

in thi^

documents

appeal
in

—

the

respondent's

files sufficient to provide the written memorandum necessary
to defeat the provisions of § 25-5-4(1):
10. Affiant believes that additional written
documents evidencing
the appli cation for
approval off and a loan to be
>e made by
Commonwealth to Affiant and spoupe
se exist in
nine percent (9%) one (1) [sic] in the file
and records of Defendant.
R.34; Addendum, Exhibit
Thus,

the

lf ff

C

sole and

(emphasis addedb.
exclusive basis for appellants'

contention that there are disputed issues of material fact
arises from Bryan Cannon's "belief" that certain writings
sufficient to defeat the provisions of § 2}5-5-4(l) exist in
respondent's files.

As a matter of lawl, however, Bryan

Cannon's mere "belief" is insufficient to provoke a genuine
issue of fact.
Rule 56(e) reads, in part:
Supporting and opposing affidavi Its shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall1 set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the ma|tters stated
-1 q -

therein, e .
When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), an affidavit
information

and

belief,

such

as

11 10

of

the

on mere
Cannon

Affidavit, is insufficient as a matter of law to provoke a
genuine issue of fact.
747,

748

(Utah

Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d

1985) •

As

a

consequence,

a

legally

sufficient opposing affidavit under Rule 56(e)
[Mjust be made on personal knowledge of the
affiant, and set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence and show that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein.
Statements made merely on
information and belief will be disregarded.
Id. (quoting, Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29
Utah.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973)).
Prior

to

the

hearing

on

its

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, respondent replied to the Cannon Affidavit with an
Affidavit

of

Affidavit").

Robert
R.44-46.

Bradley

Meadows

(the

"Meadows

(A copy of the Meadows Affidavit is

contained at R.44-46, is included as Exhibit

"D" to the

Addendum, and is incorporated herein by such reference.)
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In

response

to

the Cannon Affidavit/

the Meadows Affidavit

contains the following sworn testimony:
f
belief
7.
Contrary
to
Bryan
Cannoq s
expressed in 11 10 of his Aff (Ldavitf no
documents authored or subscribed b^ defendant,
its agents or employees exist, or have ever
existed, in the files and records d f defendant
way
to
referring
or
relating
in
any
defendant's alleged offer to loan money to
plaintiffs; this is so because defendant never
approved a loan to plaintiffs and never
authorized or approved a loan cojfnmitment to
plaintiffs.

8.
I know the statements contained in 11 7 of
this Affidavit are true because any such
documents would have to be reviewed by me, and
would have to be contained in plaintiff's
application file. I neither wrote or received
such documents, and plaintiff's application
has
never
file does
not
contain, and
contained, such documents.
R.45; Addendum, Exhibit "D".
Not only, therefore, does the Cannon Affidavit fail to
establish a disputed issue of material fact sufficient to
defeat

the

provisions

of

§ 25-5-4(1),

but

the

Meadows

Affidavit provides competent and uncontroyerted admissible
testimony that no such documents exist.

Accordingly, there

was no disputed issue of material fact aj: the hearing on
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment,
judgment entered by the District Court was proper under Rule
56(e).
B.

Appellants did not properly or t imely invoke the
provisions of Rule 56(f).
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

-91-

When affidavits are unavailable.
Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a
continuance
to permit
affidavits
to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or he may make such other
order as is just*
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (emphasis added).
Appellants cite, at page 9 of their Brief, the case of
Caplinger

v.

Carter,

9 Kan.App.

2d

287, 676 P.2d

1300

(1984), for the proposition that "summary judgment should
not be entered where the opposing party is proceeding with
due diligence with pretrial discovery but has not had
opportunity to complete it."

an

Appellants fail, however, to

disclose in their brief the application the Kansas court
made of this rule:
However, plaintiffs had done little discovery
in the state court action and had allowed a
limitation on discovery set by the court for
July 15, 1982 to expire.
"The control of
discovery is entrusted to the discretion of
the trial court." . . .
We are not prepared
to say that the court abused its discretion in
adhering
to
the
discovery
limitations
established in February of 1982. The summary
judgment decision cannot be overturned simply
because discovery was incomplete.
Id. at 1305 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
For Rule 56(f) to apply at all, an opposing party must
file an affidavit complying with the Rulefs requirements; in
the absence of such an affidavit, the appellate court should
refuse to consider an argument that further discovery was
-22-

necessary.

Callioux v. Progressive Ins. C6., 70 Utah Adv.

Rep. 32, 34 (App. 1987) (citing, Jackson v, Layton City, 743
P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1987)).

In such a^ affidavit, the

party opposing summary judgment
must show to the best of his ability what
facts are within the movant's exclusive
knowledge or control; what steps have been
taken to obtain the desired information
pursuant to discovery procedures under the
Rules; and that he is desirous of taking
advantages of these discovery procedures.
Id. at 33 (quoting, 2 J. Moore, W. Tagga rt & J. Wicker,
Moore's Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis
added)).

In short,

ff

'filing an affidavit is necessary for

the preservation of a Rule 56(f) contention that summary
judgment should be delayed pending furthe r discovery.'
Id.

(quoting,

Mid-South

Grizzlies

v.

National

Football

League, 720 F.2d 772, 780 n.4 (3d Cir. 19831).
In this case, appellants failed to comply at any time
with the procedures necessary to invoke tpe provisions of
Rule

56(f).

The only affidavit of any nature filed by

appellants is the Cannon Affidavit included as Exhibit "C"
to the Addendum.

There is nothing in ^xhibit

"C" that

satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(f).
The Complaint in this matter was filed on May 15, 1987,
R.2; the hearing on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
did not take place until July 10, 1987, ajlmost two months
later.

R.21, 59.

During this intervening 56-day period,
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appellants made absolutely no efforts to conduct discovery
of any sort; this Court has specifically noted that a mere
17-day period provides "ample time" within which to oppose a
motion pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56(f).
34.

Id. at

Accordingly, this Court is in no position to " 'spare

the litigants from their own lack of diligence. f "

Id.

(quoting, Herbert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218f 222 (1st Cir.
1984) ) .
Moreover, as demonstrated in point II.A., supra, it is
undisputed that the only documents purportedly undiscovered
by appellants —

documents sufficient to satisfy the Statute

of Frauds (Appellants' Brief, p. 10) —
have

never

existed.

R.45;

do not exist, and

Addendum,

Exhibit

"D".

Accordingly, a Rule 56(f) affidavit would serve no probative
purpose, because "[i]f the most that can be hoped for is a
chance

to discredit

the affiants' statement or focus on

demeanor, no question of material fact is presented."

Id.

(citing, Modern Home Institute, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co.,

513 F.2d 102, 110 (2nd Cir. 1975)).

CONCLUSION
Respondent's alleged oral agreement to loan appellants
money to be repaid over 30 years is void under Utah Code
Ann. § 25-5-4(1).

Neither the speculative possibility of

that loan's repayment within one year, nor the fact that
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respondent might have, or could have, disbursed funds within
one year is sufficient to remove the bar of § 25-5-4(1).
issue of

Moreover, there was no disputed

material

fact

before the District Court at the hearing on respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and appellants• untimely and
ineffective

invocation

of Rule

56(f) faifLs to create a

disputed question of material fact.

The sunpary judgment of

the District Court should be affirmed.
DATED January 6, 1988.
HANSEN & ANDfiRSON

&UML

Robert M. An
Bruce WycofJ
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake Citjy, Utah 84101
Attorneys fort Respondent
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day qf January, 1988,
I

caused

to

be mailed, postage prepaid, four

true and

correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to the
following:
Dennis K. Poole, Esq.
Duane R. Smith, Esq.
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH
Attorneys for Appellants
4885 South 900 East, #306
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BRYAN W. CANNON and
DANA R. CANNON,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
COMMONWEALTH WESTERN
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, an
Oregon corporation, now known
as COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Civil No. C87-3337
Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

Defendant

Commonwealth

Western

Mortgage

Corporation

("Commonwealth") respectfully submits this Memorandum 'in Reply to Plaintiffs'
Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Commonwealth

filed

its

Motion to

Dismiss

on June 4, 1987;

Commonwealth received plaintiffs' Affidavit in Opposition to that Motion on June

25, 1987. 1
II.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFFS1 AFFIDAVIT DOES NOTHING TO TAKE THE ALLEGED
AGREEMENT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A.

The Disclosure Statement Does Not Prove the Alleged Agreement.
Plaintiffs apparently assert that the Federal Truth in Lending Loan

Disclosure Statement attached to the Jane 22, 1987, Affidavit of Bryan W. Cannon
("Cannon Affidavit") as Exhibit "1" (the "Disclosure Statement") in some way
proves Commonwealth's commitment to make the alleged loan to plaintiffs. For
the reasons that follow, this is not the case.
The Disclosure Statement specifically is denominated a "Federal Truth
in Lending" Disclosure Statement. The Federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") is
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.

The congressional purpose in an enacting

TIL A was as follows:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be
enhanced and the competition among various financial
institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed
use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an
awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the
purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be
able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit, . . . .
15U.S.C. § 1601(a).
In 1974, Congress specifically extended these policies to real estate
mortgage loans when it enacted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of
1

By filing their Affidavit, plaintiffs have, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b), converted the pending motion into a motion for summary judgment.
-2-

1974 ("RESPA"), which is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

After making

findings and stating its purpose to be similar to TILAl, Congress, in RESPA,
extended the protections of RESPA to all "federally related mortgage loans".
That term was defined to be one which "is secured by a first lien on residential
real property . . . designed principally for the occupancy of from one to four
families; . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(A).
In 1982, the Board of Governors of the Federal IReserve System issued,
at 12 CFR § 226, the regulations necessary to implement} both TILA and RESPA
("Reg. Z"). Reg. Z imposes specific duties with respect to residential mortgage
loans:
The creditor shall make disclosures before consummation
of the transaction.
In certain residential mortgage
transactions, special timing requirements are set forth in
§226.19.
12 CFR § 226.17(b) (emphasis added). "Consummation" }s defined as "the time
that a consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction." 12
CFR § 226.2(a)(13). In this regard, Reg. Z imposes the following legal obligations
on a lender who has received an application for a loan respecting a residential
mortgage:
(a) Time of disclosure.
In a residential mortgage
transaction subject to [RESPA] the creditor shall make
good faith estimates of the disclosures required by
§ 226.18 before consummation, or shall deliver or place
them in the mail not later than 3 business days after the
creditor receives the consumer's written application,
whichever is earlier.
12 CFR § 226.19(a) (emphasis added). Reg. Z also contains sample forms to be
used by lenders in order to comply with § 226.

A copy of sample form H-13

included in Appendix G to Reg. Z ("Sample H-13") is attached hereto as Exhibit
A". Sample H-13 is functionally identical to Exhibit "1" to the Cannon Affidavit.

ff A f t
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In other words, Commonwealth was required by federal law to give
Exhibit "1" to plaintiffs not later than three days after their application for
credit. The federal purpose of this requirement was to allow plaintiffs to compare
the cost of credit offered by Commonwealth as of December 22, 1986, with the
costs of credit offered at that time by other lenders. Reg. Z makes clear that a
lender's preparation of Sample H-13 at the time of a loan application in no way
obligates the lender to make the loan described therein:
(b) Redisclosure required. If the annual percentage rate
in the consummated transaction varies from the annual
percentage rate disclosed under § 226.18(e) by more than
1/8 of 1 percentage point in a regular transaction or more
than 1/4 of 1 percentage point in an irregular transaction,
as defined in § 226.22, the creditor shall disclose the
changed terms no later than consummation or settlement.
12 CFR § 226.19(b).
A lender's preparation of documents such as Sample H-13 and Exhibit
"l" in no way constitute that lender's offer to make a loan. Instead, they merely
represent what a loan actually consummated and made on the date of disclosure
would look like. In fact, approximately 30% of the applications for loans received
by Commonwealth never lead to a commitment to issue a loan.

(Meadows

Affidavit, 1f4.) In this regard, one Federal Court has noted that "the disclosure
statement is not actually part of the contract between plaintiffs and
defendants;.. . Rather, the statement is an ancillary document included because
required by federal statute.'1

Tryst v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of

Chester, 466 F.Supp. 578, 594 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Because Exhibit "1" was prepared in response to federal law, and
because it does not represent a legally sufficient offer to make a contract

-4-

nnni

between the parties, Exhibit "1" is insufficient to take the alleged agreement to
loan money to plaintiffs out of the Statute of Frauds.
B.

Title Reports do not Take an Alleged Oral Agreement to Loan Money
out of the Statute of Frauds.
Plaintiffs apparently contend also that the title j reports attached to the

Cannon Affidavit as Exhibits ff2fl and "3" (the "Title Repdrts") somehow take the
alleged oral agreement outside the Statute of Frauds. This is not the case. In the
first place, the Title Reports are in no way subscribeq by Commonwealth as
specifically required by Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4.

Moreover, even if the Title

Reports were, they would not take Commonwealth's alleged agreement to loan
money to plaintiffs out of the Statute of Frauds:
[I]t is well established that incurring expenses fof a search
of title and preparation of of [sic] the costs of
improvements; arranging for financing for the purchase
does not constitute sufficient part performance to take
the case out of the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
Weale v. Massachusetts Gen. Housing Corp., 117 N.H. 428, 374 A.2d 925 (1977)
(emphasis added; citations omitted).

A copy of Weale is attached hereto as

Exhibit "B,f; the quoted language appears at page 4 of the attached copy.
Consequently, the Title Reports attached to the | Cannon Affidavit in no
way take Commonwealth's alleged agreement to loan plaintiffs money out of the
Statute of Frauds.
III.
CONCLUSION
The pleadings in this matter demonstrate that plaintiffs are barred by
the Statute of Frauds from proving the agreement alleged in their Complaint. The
record is devoid of any competent evidence that such ah agreement was ever
made.

Accordingly, Commonwealth should receive summkry judgment that the
-5-

cause of action asserted in plaintiffs1 Complaint is barred by the Statute of
Frauds-2
DATED July

6

, 1987.
HANSEN & ANDERSON

Bruce Wycoff
50 West Broadway Sncfh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July, 1987, I caused to be hand
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss to the
following:

Dennis K. Poole
Duane R. Smith
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH
4885 South 4180 West, Suite 306
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

£/y ,/}]. , A ^

^Of necessity, plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Complaint must
similarly be denied because it similarly alleges nothing sufficient to take the
alleged agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.
(Continued)
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Part 226, App. G

patrol R#s#rv# System
^.13—Mortgage with Demand Feature Sample

mortgage Savings and Loan Assoc,

Glenn Jones
700 Oak Drive
Little Creek, USA

pate: April 15, 1981

ANNUAL
PERCENTAGE
RATE
TH« eoit of vowr cr«d*t

FINANCE
CHARGE

Amount
Financed

Total of
Payments

T*e do"*/ tmo*i*t
?*t crtdu will cost

The jmoMAt ol c/td«f
provided ce vou o* on

The amount voo will
Hevt o * d j f \*t you
* * * • modi ati ptvmemf
M«cfi«dui«d

VOU

\4X*

|5lp,55l5^ ^ ( o O S . f c f e

S

40l,IS7.ai)|

Your neyment schedule will be:
Numoff o' ? a v « m * i

3L>a

Amow** 5* • i v m * r i $

'*S5fr.T7

' W * t « *av*»»c*?* Ar« Du«

imor>d-Uu bg^mnir^ fa|i 1ft

This obligation has a demand feature.

You may obtain property insurance from anyone you want that is acceptable to Mortgage Savings and Loan Assoc.. If you get
the insurance from Mortgage Savings and Loan Assoc, you will pay S.

ISO-

Security: You if giving a security interest in:
^Ek the goods or property being purchased.

D
Late Charge: If a payment •$ late, you will be charged S«

I0L

W

not the payment.

Prepayment: If you pay off tarty, you may have to pay a penalty.
Assumption: Someone buying your house may, subject to conditions, bt allowed to assume the remainder of the mortgage on
the original terms.
See your contnct documents for any additional information about nonpayment, default, any required repayment m full before
the scheduled date, and prepayment refunds §nt^ penalties.
I

t means an estimate

000054

PAGE
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374 A.2d 925 printed in FULL format.
WILLIAM U. WEALE & a. v. MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOUSING
CORPORATION & a., STEPHEN C. COLE v. MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING
CORPORATION & a.
No. 7505
Supreme Court of New Hampshire
117 N.H. 428.; 374 A.2d 925
May 31, 1977
Grafton
Stebbins & Bradley and Michael L. Slive, of Hanover (Mr, Sliye orally), for
William W. Weale and William R. Jordan.
Struckhaff & Kelly, of West Lebanon (Mr. Lawrence A. Kelly orally), for
Stephen C. Cole.
Massachusetts General Housing Corporation did not appear.
LAMPRON
LAMPRON, J. Bills in equity for specific performance of contracts to sell a
parcel of land in West Lebanon. The first bill, by Weale and Jordan., is based
on an oral agreement of purchase and sale between them and General Housing. The
other, by Cole, arises from a later written agreement by General Housing to sell
the same parcel to him. Hearing before Johnson, J., who made certain findings
and rulings and ordered General Housing to convey the property to Weale and
Jordan; oVdered Cole to file a release" of his recorded written agreement to
purchase this land; and ordered General Housing to refund to Cole his $3,000
deposit. We hold that the trial court's orders must be set aside.
Massachusetts Housing purchased the 27 acres of land in question on July 11,
1972, and on September ~14, 1972, executed a note for $25,000 to the National
Eank of Lebanon, secured by a mortgage on this land. Edward J. Sylvia and Erwin
Brand, the sole stockholders in this" corporation, signed as guarantors. As the
terms of the note were not being met, the bank notified the signers that it was
asking its attorney to prepare "foreclosure notices if payment was not made in
full by February 15, 1974.
As a result, Brand, on behalf of Massachusetts Housing, authorized Marchewka,
a Lebanon realtor, to find a purchaser for the property. On or about February
15, Weale and Jordan made a verbal offer of $25,000 which was rejected by Brand.
However, on February 18 Brand authorized the realtor to sell the land "at no
cost to us." This counteroffer was understood by all the parties to mean that
the purchasers would pay the $25,000 note and all interest due, as well as the
unpaid real estate taxes and the broker's commission. Weale and Jordan agreed
to these terms and upon so learning Brand called it "a deal." The purchasers
were notified to that effect. When Marchewka told the bank of this agreement
the foreclosure proceedings were not initiated.
Weale and Jordan secured a commitment from the Lebanon National Bank to
finance the transaction. The bank attorney then made an examination af t A f i n n j
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title and prepared a mortgage deed for which Weale an$ Jordan were billed $150.
In reliance on their oral agreement, the latter also engaged an engineer to make
a preliminary survey and a "design for the subdivision!of the land. Weale and
Jordan received an invoice in the amount of $2,860 fof this work. On March 21,
1974, Weale and Jordan, the realtor, and officers of the bank met and agreed on
a closing date of April 4, 1974. This date was chosen to accommodate Sylvia,
the other stockholder with Brand of Massachusetts Housing.
On March 28, 1974, plaintiff Stephen Cole learned f the proposed sale to
Weale and Jordan. He went to West Lebanon and saw a :ract of land which bore
evidence of recent survey work. Upon learning the id ntity of the owner, Cole
called Sylvia directly offering to purchase this land and on Sunday evening
March 31, 1974, Cole and Sylvia signed a contract of burchase and sale in
Lebanon and a $3,000 deposit was made. The closing of the deal under this
contract was scheduled for April 3, 1974, one day pri or to the closing of the
Weale and Jordan deal. Neither closing took place.
Meanwhile on April 1, 1974, Marchewka, the realtor^, learned of the contract
between Cole and Massachusetts Housing. A written agjireement containing the
terms of the Weale and Jordan transaction was drawn and sent to Sylvia without a
deposit. It was never executed by Massachusetts Housing. Both plaintiffs
placed attachments an the land which still stands in the name of Massachusetts
Housing.
The Statute of Frauds in this state provides as follows "RSA 506:1 Sale of
Land. No action shall be maintained upon a contract far the sale of land unless
the agreement upon which it is brought or some memo r^ndum thereof, is in writing
and signed by the party to be charged,, or by some pe rjson by him thereto
authorized by writing." Such a statute is intended tcj) promote certainty and to
protect from frauds and perluries in land transacti ohs . J. Calamari and J.
Perillo, Contracts § 282 (1970).
However, a strict enforcement of the statute can produce frustration on the
one hand, and unethical conduct on the other. Calamari and Perillo., supr^ §
282. Hence the law seeks to alleviate the harshness of the statute when some
operating facts./ such as fraud,, part performance or other eguitable
considerations, are present. Mere refusal to carry put an oral promise to
convey land standing by itself is not fraud or prounq for relief. 3 S.
Williston, Contracts 8 533A, at 809 (Jaeger edf 196QL
However., a .generally recognized ground for relief is when the prospective
purchaser has "taken possession of the property with ^he consent or knowledge of
the seller and has made valuable improvements on the premises in anticipation of
the transfer of title. Relief is based on the consideration that to enforce the
statute would result in uniust enrichment to the seljLer or fraud on his part
Sawin v. Carr, 114 N.H. 462, 323 A.2d 924 (1974); L.
ed. 1965); Emery v. Dana, 76 N.H. 483, 488, 84 A. 97£, 978 (1912); White v.
Poole, 74 N.H. 71, 65 A. 255 (1906).
The trial court based its decree of specific performance in favor of Weale
and Jordan on the following findings and rulings, " p e oral contract conveying
real estate between Massachusetts "Housing and "the plaintiff Weale and Jordan wis
legally binding because it (1) contained a readily ascertainable purchase price.,
(2) contained'the other necessary requisites of a rqal estate contract, and (3)
that in reliance upon this oral contract the plainti'"
ffs contracted for

000056

PAGE
117 N.H. 428.; 374 A.2d 925
extensive closing and development costs- In addition the plaintiffs assisted
Massachusetts Housing in that their ofer, which was accepted by Massachusetts
Housing, resulted in the National Bank of Lebanon foregoing further steps to
foreclose on the property. The Court finds that the plaintiffs1 actions
constituted sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the statute
of frauds and make it a binding contract on the part of Massachusetts Housing-11
The trial court properly found present one of the requirements to support a
decree of specific performance, that is, that the terms of the oral agreewent
between Weale and Jordan and Massachusetts Housing were definite and ~
ascertainable. Sawin v. Carr, 114 N.H. 462., 323 A.2d 924 (1974). However, it
is well established that incurring expenses for a search of title and
preparation of of the costs of improvements; arranging for financing for the
purchase does not constitute sufficient part performance to take the case out 01
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 3 S. Williston, Contracts S 494, at
565 (Jaeger ed. 1960); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds § 409 (1974).
Weale and Jordan were billed $150 for the mortgage deed and search of title
and $2,860 for a preliminary survey and design of subdivision. However about
half of the latter work was done after they had knowledge that Massachusetts
Housing had signed a contract with Cole for the sale of this land. The
abandonment of foreclosure proceedings did not constitute forbearance on the
part of Weale and Jordan. They did not relinquish any rights or forbear to
their deteriment to take action which they might otherwise have taken. The
benefits, if any, which the lack of foreclosure by the bank conferred on
Massachusetts Housing would not constitute unjust enrichment of the defendant at
the expense of Weale and Jordan. 73 Am,Jur.2d Statute of Frauds S 453 (1974).
Thus the equitable considerations usually relied on to constitute part
performance to justify ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to
sell land in order to prevent fraud or unjust enrichment on the part of the
defendant have not been specifically found by the trial court. An examination
of the record before us also reveals that it would not support an order taking
the oral agreement of the parties out of the statutory requirement that an
agreement to sell land must be in writinjj.
The trial court properly ruled that the defense of the Statute of Frauds
could be raised even thouqh it miqht not have been timely filed. Blanchard v.
Calderwood, 110 N.H. 29, "260 A.2d"" 118 (1969); see Superior Court Rule No. 26,
RSA 491: App.R._26 (Supp. 1975). However, the trial court's ruling that
Massachusetts Housing and Cole were estopped from pleading the sta'tute was in
error. The repudiation of the oral contract by Massachusetts Housing was not in
itself conduct which gives rise to estoppel. Nor does the action of Cole in
takinq advantaje of the fact that Weale and Jordan had an unenforceable contract
to purchase this land. To hold that they are estopped to assert the defense of
the statute in the absence of part performance sufficient to constitute an
equitable consideration to grant relief to the purchaser would amount to a
virtual repeal of the statute itself. 2 A. Corbin, Contracts S 422A (Supp.
1971); see D. Dobbs, Remedies 8 13.2, at 963 (1973); Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037,
1077 (1974). The decree of the trial court is set aside and the order is
Exceptions of Cole sustained.
DOUGLAS, J., did not sit; the others concurred.

'
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16TH CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
MR. AND MRS. SAM E. ELLIS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, VS. JOHN
M. ROYSTER, SR., Defendant-Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section
Slip Opinion
April 12, 1984
ANDERSON LAW.
HONORABLE JAMES B. SCOTT, JR., JUDGE.
Franks., J. wrote the opinion.
Sanders, J.

CONCUR: James W. Parrtott, P.J., Clifford E.

JOSEPH H. VAN HOOK, Oliver Springs, for plaintiffs-appellants.
J. MICHAEL LAIN, Oak Ridge, for defendant-appellee.
Franks
Franks, J.
In this action for debt, the trial judge entered su^ma ry judgment for the
defendant on the grounds that the Statute of Frauds n1 bars this action.
n1 The provision of the statute pertinent to this action is:
T.C.A.
brought:

§ 29-2-101.

Writing required for action.

No action shall be

(5) Upon any agreement or contract which is not to pe performed within the
space of one (1) year from the making thereof: unless he promise or agreement,
upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof,
shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be changed therewith, or some
other person by hfm thereunto lawfully authorized.
The complaint alleges defendant and his wife borrowed $5,894.76 from
plaintiffs which was to be repaid "over a period of ti (ne on a monthly payment
basis." The complaint further avers the defendant owes the plaintiffs $2,947.38
plus interest in the amount, as set out in the promissp ry note executed by the
plaintiffs to the Bank of Oak Ridge.
Plaintiffs, responding to a motion for a more specific statement, filed a
copy of the note dated April 26, 1979, wherein the plaintiffs borrowed $4,326.72
from the Bank of Oak Ridge; a letter dated March 25, 1983, from the assistant
vice-president of the bank to their attorney which, in substance, states the
proceeds from the loan made to the plaintiffs "were used as a down payment on a
house for their daughter, Party Royster, and husband. Payments were to be paid
by Patty Royster, daughter." Another notation filed, apparently from the bank
records, was to the effect that plaintiffs were loaned[$4,326.72 for 48 months,
with the daughter to make payments on the loan.

EXHIRiT B

Slip Opinion
Responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed a
copy of a check dated Hay 1, 1979, payable to John M. Royster and Patricia E.
Royster in the amount of $5,894*76, with the notation for "home" and signed by
plaintiff, Mrs. Ellis. The back of the check shows an endorsement by defendant
and his former wife, Patricia E. Royster.
Plaintiffs argue the Statute of Frauds is not applicable, insisting the
defendant could have paid the debt in full at any time after making the debt,
i.e., within one year after the date of the loan.
The applicable rule is
the statute is limited to contracts which by a fair and reasonable
interpretation of the terms used by the parties, and in view of all the
circumstances, does not admit of its performance according to its language and
intention within a year from the time of its making. Johnston v. Cincinnatti
N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co.', 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 429 (1921); Anderson-Gregory Co. v.
Lea, 51 Tenn.App. 612, 370 S.W.2d 934 (1963). The trial court's determination
finds support in application of this rule. The test is not, as the plaintiffs
argue, that the debt could have been paid in full in one year but rather what
the understanding of the parties was. The understanding under plaintiffs'
theory and the documents in evidence establish that payments in satisfaction of
the alleged loan would extend repayments beyond a period of one year.
Plaintiffs further argue there are sufficient notes and documents and other
memoranda surrounding the transaction to take the contract out of the Statute
of Frauds.
The general rule of law pertaining to this issue is stated in
Lambert v. Home Federal Sayings and Loan Association, 481 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn.
1972), and is that a memorandum, in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, must
contain the essential terms of the contract expressed with such certainty that
they may be understood from the memorandum or some other writing to which it
refers or with which it is connected without resorting to parorevidence. The
only instrument signed by the defendant in this record was his endorsement on
the check from plaintiffs which, standing alone, does not establish any debt.
The note and documents in the form of bank records and a letter from a bank
officer are not statements made by defendant nor "by some other person by him
thereunto lawfully authorized." In Re Estate of Dickerson, 600 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn.
1980). Moreover, were the documents properly admissible in evidence, a
contractual obligation requiring the defendant to pay monies to the plaintiffs
would not be established.
Finally, plaintiffs contend they did not have a chance to offer to the trial
court "the various contracts, notes, testimony of witnesses and other documents
which surrounded the loan transaction." There is no suggestion in the record
that other documentary evidence relating to the alleged contract was available;
moreover, ample provision is made under" T.R.C.P., Rule 56, for the filing of
affidavits where probative oral testimony would create a disputed issue of
material fact. The issues are resolved against plaintiffs.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand at plaintiffs* cost.
CONCUR: James W. Parrott, P.J., Clifford E. Sanders, J.
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
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DENNIS K. POOLE, #2625
DUANE R. SMITH, #2996
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone (801) 263-3344
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURt OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

BRYAN W. CANNON and
DANA R. CANNON,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
TO (DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
DISMISS

vs.
COMMONWEALTH WESTERN
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, an
Oregon corporation, now known
as COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Civil No. C87-3337
Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
* * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Bryan W. Cannon, being firsp duly sworn, upon oath,
hereby deposes and says as follows:
1.

He is one of the Plaintifffs in the above-entitled

2.

That on or about December 15, 1986, he met with

action.

Brad Meadows, Manager of the Salt Lake Office of Commonwealth
Western Mortgage Corporation, now knowl as Commonwealth Mortgage
Corporation of America

(herein "Commonwealth" or "Defendant"),

for purpose of discussing a loan by Commonwealth to Affiant and
his spouse.
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3. At the time of such conference with Brad Meade
Mr* Meadows represented to Affiant that Affiant and Affian
spouse could receive a loan, after qualification, with an int
est rate of nine percent (9%) and one (1) point origination fe
4. Mr. Meadows requested that Plaintiffs supply S
with

a

written

written

loan

application

application.

Plaintiffs

supplied s<

to Defendant, Commonwealth, on or ab<

December 16, 1987.
5.

To

confirm

said

application

Defendant

mai!

Plaintiffs a Federal Truth and Lending Loan Disclosure Statemei
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "1". Said stat
ment is believed to have been prepared by Defendant through i
agents and clearly identifies the parties and terms of the lc
offered to Plaintiffs.
6.

After

receivers

said application, Defendant r

quested and received a written appraisal on Plaintiff's hom
which reflects an appraised value of $129,500.00.
7.

On or about April 27, 1987, Defendant requested a

received a written commitment for title insurance from Sure
Title. Agency of Salt Lake City, Utah, under their File N<
17023W, which title report committed to issue a ALTA Lender
Policy in the amount of $116,500.00 for the benefit of Defendani
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "2".
8.

On at least two occasions, Brad Meadows request*

that Surety Title order payoff information from City Mortgac
Company, the present first mortgage holder on the residence c

-2-

ooooa;

Plaintiffs.

Said requests were made in writing by Surety Title

Agency to City Mortgage Company.
9.

Plaintiffs received a written request from Defen-

dant to provide explanation of credit information so that the
loan

processing

could

be

completed.

Plaintiffs

provided

a

written response for said credit information to the Defendant;
Said written response was obtained from Affiant by Brad Meadows.
10.

Affiant believes that adc
3 <i itional written documents

evidencing the application for approval! of, and a loan to be made
by Commonwealth to Affiant and spouse ^xist in nine percent (9%)
one (1) in the file and records of Defendant.
11.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant did not refuse to

make a loan to Plaintiffs, but only th^t Commonwealth refused to
make a loan for the rate and terms to which they had previously
agreed.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHTJ
DATED this

day of June, 1987.

Subscribed and sworn to £e1:or£ me this ^JL^
June, 1987.

day of

NUTARY PUBLie 6
~
Residing at Murray, Utah

My Commission Expires:
November 19, 1990

-3-
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FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING LOAN DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
DECEMBER 22, 1986

nATf

BORROWERS NAME

800343

LOAN NUMBER
LOANAMOUNTS

BORROWERS NAME

121,500.00

A00RESS

10307

BRYANE W. CANNON
DANA R. CANNON
SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE

SANDY, UT 8 4 0 9 2
CRED|T0R

COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE COMPANY OF AMERICA, L . P .

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
RATE
The cost of your credit as
a yearly rate

9.257

FINANCE CHARGE
The dollar amount me
credit will cost you

233,177.10

%

A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSH

AMOUNT FINANCED
The amount of credit
Drovided to you or on your
behalf

TOTAL OF PAYMENT
The amount you will h
paid after you have mi
all payments as schedi

351,943.20

118,766.10

PAYMENTS: Your payment schedule will be
Number of
Payments

Amount of
Payments

977.62

360

When Payments
are Due
Monthly
Beginning

Number of
Payments

Amount of
Payments

When Payments
are Due
Monthly
Beginning

Number of
Payments

Amount of
Payments

When Payr
are Du
Monthi
Beginnn

2/01/1987

This obligation JS does D does not have a demand feature.
INSURANCE:
Credit Life Insurance and Credit Disability Insurance are not required to obtain credit
You may obtain Property Insurance from anyone you want that is acceptable to credit
If you desire Homeowner's Insurance from Commonwealth Mortgage Company of America L P your premium will be 3
SECURITY:
You are giving a security interest in the property located at
10307
FILING FEES:

SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE,

SANDY, UT 8 4 0 9 2

$.

LATE CHARGE.
If payment is not received within
past due installment or $

FIfcTttEN
4 8 . 88

days of its due date, you will be charged
, whichever sum is greater

5.0

%<

PREPAYMENT:
If you pay off early, you Q may GDCwill not have to pay a penalty
D may (SXwill not be entitled to a refund of part of the finance charge.
ASSUMPTION:
Someone buying your house U may C may, subject to conditions, £ ? may not assume the remainder of your loan o
original terms.
REQUIREO DEPOSIT:
The annual percentage rate does not take into account your required deposit
See your contract documents ro r any additional information about nonpayment default, and required repayment in full b
the scheduled date, and prepayment refunds and penalties
I desire an itemization of amount financed

DANA R. CANNON

Yes D

No G

BRYANE W. CANNON

All dates and numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosures are estimates

FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING LOAN (DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

0A7t

DECEMBER 22, 1936

BORROWERS NAME .

800343

LOAN NUMBER
LOANAMOUNTS

BORROWERS NAME .

121,500.00

BRYANE W. CANNON
DANA R. CANNON

1 0 3 0 7 SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE

ADDRESS

SANDY, UT 8 4 0 9 2
CCMMONWEALIH JORTGAGE COMPANY OF AMERICA,! L . P .

CREDITOR

FINANCE CHARGE
The dollar a m o u n t the
credit w i l l c o s t you

A N N U A L PERCENTAGE
RATE
The cost of your credit as
a yearly rate

233.177.10

9.257 %

A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

AMOUNT FINANCED
Trpe amount of credit
prov|ded to you or on your
behalf

TOTAL OF PAYMENTS
The a m o u n t you will have
paid after you have m a d e
all p a y m e n t s as s c h e d u l e d

351,943.20

118,766.10

P A Y M E N T S : Your p a y m e n t s c h e d u l e w i l l be:
Number of
Payments

Amount of
Payments

When Payments Numoer of
are Due
Payments

Amount of
Payments

Monthly
Beginning

360

977.62

This obligation 1 5 does

When Payments Number of
are Due
Payments
(Monthly
beginning

Amount of
Payments

When Payments
are Due
Monthly
Beginning

2/01/1987

Q

does not have a d e m a n d feature.

INSURANCE:
Credit Life Insurance and Credit Disability Insurance are not required to obtain credit.
You may obtain Property Insurance from anyone you want that is acceptable to credit.
If you desire Homeowner's Insurance from Commonwealth Mortgage Compdny of America. L.P your premium will be S
SECURITY:
You are giving a security interest in the property located at

10307

SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE,

SANDY, UT 8 4 0 9 2

R U N G FEES:
LATE C H A R G E .
If payment is not received within
past due installment or S

FIFTEEN
48. 88

days of its due date, you will be charged .

5."0

% of the

, whichever sum is greater.

PREPAYMENT:
If you pay off early, you Q
D

may
may

GPWill not have to pay a penalty.
GPWill not be entitled to a refund of part of the finance charge.

ASSUMPTION:
Someone buying your house G

may C m a y , subject to conditions, 5 ^ may not assume tne remainder of your loan on the
original terms.

REQUIRED OEPOSIT:
The annual percentage rate does not take into account your required deposit.
See your contract documents ro r any additional information about nonpayment, default, and required repayment in full before
the scheduled date, and prepayment refunds and penalties.
I desire an itemization of amount financed:

DANA R. CANNON

Yes D

No D

BRYANE W. CANNON

A l l d a t e s a n d n u m e r i c a l d i s c l o s u r e s except the late p a y m e n t d i s c l o s u r e s are e s t i m a t e s .

Commitment Face Page

COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE
ISSUED BY

Surety Tifle Agency
1445 EAST 2100 SOUTH • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105
(801)486-5300

C(>M)NWEALTH WESTERN M3RTGAGE
4001 South 700 East
Murray, Utah 84107
Acct/425

RE: Cannon
F i l e No. 17023W

Attention: Brad

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, herein called the Company, for valuable consideratior
hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the propose
Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described o
referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedule
A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof.
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the police
or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuano
of this Commitment or by subsequent indorsement.
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and alt liability and obli
gations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or policies
committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fauli
of the Company. This Commitment shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by an authorized officer or agent
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Commitment to be signed and sealed, to become valid wher
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. This Commitment
is effective as of the date shown in Schedule A as "Effective Date."

\[\.i

• ,

First American Title Insurance Company

^>Jf^C
ATTEST

W JUU£\-*lLr.

PRESIDENT

S £ZC^sL~~

d

SECRETARY

COUNTERSIGNED

M

GOO<

Form 1756-A
Commitment, Schedule A

SCHEDULE A

1.

Effective Date:

April 22, 1987
a t 8:00 a.m.

Commitment No:

Policy or Policies to be issued:
(a)

O

17023W

Amount

ALTA Owner's Policy
Proposed Insured:

(b)

E3

Proposed Insured:

(c) |EJ

116,550.00
TBD

ALTA Loan Policy

CX>MDNWEALTH WESTERN MORTGAGE]

INDORSEMENTS 1 0 0 & 1 1 6

30.00

The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this commitment and covered herein is fee simple and
title thereto is at the effective date hereof vested in:

BRYAN W. CANNON and DANA R. CANNON, husband and wife as joint tenants
with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common
The land referred to in this commitment is

All of Lot #22, WHITE CITY #50 SUBDIVISION, as recorded in the official
plat thereof in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
SITUATE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY
ADDRESS: 10307 South Edgecliff Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092

^nriril 1 ^

Fcum 17bb - H2 (Revved July, 1072)
Commitment, Schedule 8-2

SCHEDULE B - Section 2
Exceptions

No. 17Q23W

The policy or policies 10 be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to the
satisfaction of the Company.
1.

Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records.

2.

Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof.

3.

Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records.

4.

Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by public records.

5.

Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof;
water rights, claims or title to water.

6.

Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law
and not shown by the public records.

7.

Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed insured acquires
of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this commitment.

8«

Taxes for the year 1987 accruing as a lien, not yet due.
Taxes for the year 1986 have been paid in the amount of $1,471.78.
Sidwell Number: 28-16-208-016.

9.

Subject property is located within the boundaries of Sandy Suburban
Inprovement District and is subject to any assessment and/or service charges
therein
U\ lln/^VjA^^^^
* F o r current information call 561-7662. ~ s cSffis*^
'p1*'
10. Subject property is located within the boundaries of Sandy City and is
subject to any assessment and/or service charges levied therein. For current
information call 566-1561.
11. Subject to a public utility easement on the Westerly 7 feet and a public
utility drainage over the Easterly 10 feet of subject property as recorded in
Book 84-5, Page 73.
12. TRUST DEED
Amount:
Beneficiary:
Trustee:
Trustor:
Dated:
Recorded:
Book/Page:
Entry No.:

$112,500.00
City Federal Savings & Loan Association
Surety Title Agency
Bryan W. Cannon and Dana R. Cannon
December 30, 1985
December 31, 1985
5723/19
4183141
Exceptions numbered

are hereby omitted.
/ ^^—.L. 1

~ J

\

ono

File No. 17023W
SCHEDULE B 2 (continued)

NOTE: A search of the Federal and State judgment' records revealed no unpaid
judgments, tax liens or bankruptcies of record against the vested
owners for the past eight years.
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FILED IN CLEWS OFFICE
SAL? LAKE CCUNH. UTAH

FILMED

J a 6 2 27 PM '87

Robert M. Anderson, #0108
Bruce Wycoff, #4448
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, Suite 600

orp

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7520
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
********

BRYAN W. CANNON and
DANA R. CANNON,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT BRADLEY MEADOWS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 087^3337

COMMONWEALTH WESTERN
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, an
Oregon corporation, now known
as COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:

County of Salt Lake

)

Robert Bradley Meadows, being first duly sworn, finder oath deposes and
states as follows:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County,] Utah, have personal

knowledge of all matters stated herein, and if called to tesjtify, I would and could
confidently testify thereto.
2.

I am the Brad Meadows referred to in the J^ine 22, 1987 Affidavit

of Bryan W. Cannon.

3.

Not later than three days following my receipt of plaintiffs* loan

application, I caused to be prepared and mailed to plaintiffs the Federal Truth in
Lending Loan Disclosure Statement (the "Disclosure Statement") attached to
Bryan CannonTs Affidavit as Exhibit "1".
4.

The Disclosure Statement

is required by federal law; its

preparation and issuance in no way obligated defendant to offer the loan described
in the Disclosure Statement, In my experience, approximately thirty percent of
loan applications and disclosure statements never lead to a commitment to issue a
loan.
5.

Defendant's standard procedure, followed in the case of plaintiff's

application, was to obtain title and credit reports before any decision was made to
approve or reject a refinance loan application such as plaintiffs.
6*

Defendant never committed to make a loan to plaintiffs on the

terms set forth in their Complaint, or on any other terms.
7.

Contrary to Bryan Cannon's belief expressed in H 10 of his

Affidavit, no documents authored or subscribed by defendant, its agents or
employees exist, or have ever existed, in the files and records of defendant
referring or relating in any way to defendant's alleged offer to loan money to
plaintiffs; this is so because defendant never approved a loan to plaintiffs and
never authorized or approved a loan commitment to plaintiffs.
8.

I know the statements contained in paragraph 7 of this Affidavit

are true because any such documents would have to be reviewed by me, and would
have to be contained in plaintiff's application file. I neither wrote nor reviewed
such documents, and plaintiff's application file does not contain, and has never
contained, such documents.
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DATED June #&

%

1987.

Robert BrSdley Meadows
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this WjU< day of June, 1987,
by Robert Bradley Meadows.

My Commission Expires:

fit 1AM m-<miu^p
. ~ L>
Mr/,
'fktqriJt mA

Notary
ary Publ
Publfc „
Residing at:_
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